Lamprotēs

oratoria

Μετὰ τὸν περὶ σεμνότητός τε καὶ τραχύτητος λόγον ἔτι τε σφοδρότητος ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν περὶ λαμπρότητος. τῶν γὰρ ποιουσῶν τὸ μέγεθός τε καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα τῷ λόγῳ ἰδεῶν ἐν τοῖς μάλιστά ἐστιν ἡ λαμπρότης. τά τε ἄλλα γὰρ ἀναγκαία ἡ ἰδέα τῷ ἀξιωματικῷ λόγῳ καὶ ὅτι δεῖ τῷ σεμνῷ τε καὶ τραχεῖ καὶ σφοδρῷ προσεἰναί τι πάντως καὶ φαιδρότητος, ἵνα μὴ πάντῃ αὐστηρὸς ᾖ· φαιδρότητος δὲ οὐ τῆς ἐν ὡραισμῷ, ἣ δὴ γλυκύτητός τε καὶ ἀφελείας ἐστίν, οὐδὲ τῆς κατʼ ἐπιμέλειαν συνθήκης κάλλος ἐχούσης τι—καίπερ γὰρ ὄν κομμωτικὸν τὸ τοιοῦτο καὶ πλεονάζον παρὰ τῷ ῥήτορι ὅμως λεπτόν ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἔχει δίαρμα οὐδὲ μέγεθος—, οὔκουν ταύτης δεῖ τῆς φαιδρότητος τῷ μεγέθει ὡς καθʼ αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀξιωματικῆς· ταύτην δὲ ποιεῖ ἡ λαμπρότης, περὶ ἧς ῥητέον. περὶ γὰρ τοῦ ἐναντίου εἴδους τῇ λαμπρότητι κἀν τῷ περὶ σφοδρότητος εἰρήκαμεν, ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ κομματικὸν καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καὶ ὄντως ἀγωνιστικὸν εἶδος τοῦ λόγου καὶ ὅλως τὸ γοργόν. γίνεται τοίνυν λόγος λαμπρὸς κατὰ ἔννοιαν μέν, ὅταν πεποίθησιν ἔχῃ τινὰ ὁ λέγων, ἐφ’ οἷς ἄν λέγῃ, ἢ διὰ τὸ ἔνδοξα εἶναι ἢ διὰ τὸ καλῶς πεπρᾶχθαι αὐτῷ ἢ διὰ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς λεγομένοις τούς ἀκούοντας ἢ καὶ διὰ πάντα ταῦτα· ὅλως τε ἐπὶ τοῖς διαπρεπέσι τῶν ἔργων καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς ἔστι λαμπρύνεσθαι ὡς ἀληθῶς, ὅπερ φησὶν Ἡρόδοτος ἐλλάμψασθαι, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ λαμπρότης· γίνεται τοίνυν λόγος λαμπρὸς κατὰ ἔννοιαν μέν, ὅταν πεποίθησιν ἔχῃ τινὰ ὁ λέγων, ἐφ’ οἷς ἄν λέγῃ, ἢ διὰ τὸ ἔνδοξα εἶναι ἢ διὰ τὸ καλῶς πεπρᾶχθαι αὐτῷ ἢ διὰ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς λεγομένοις τούς ἀκούοντας ἢ καὶ διὰ πάντα ταῦτα· ὅλως τε ἐπὶ τοῖς διαπρεπέσι τῶν ἔργων καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς ἔστι λαμπρύνεσθαι ὡς ἀληθῶς, ὅπερ φησὶν Ἡρόδοτος ἐλλάμψασθαι, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ λαμπρότης· οἶον “οὐ λίθοις ἐτείχισα τὴν πόλιν οὐδὲ πλίνθοις ἐγώ, οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τούτοις μέγιστον τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ φρονῶ· ἀλλ’ ἐὰν βούλῃ τὸν ἐμὸν τειχισμόν” καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς, καὶ πάλιν “αὕτη τῶν περὶ Θήβας ἐγένετο πραγμάτων ἀρχὴ καὶ κατάστασις πρώτη, τὰ πρὸ τούτων εἰς ἔχθραν καὶ μῖσος καὶ ἀπιστίαν τῶν πόλεων ὑπηγμένων ὑπὸ τούτων. τοῦτο τὸ ψήφισμα τὸν τότε περιστάντα τῇ πόλει κίνδυνον παρελθεῖν ἐποίησεν ὥσπερ νέφος”, καὶ πάλιν “ταῦτα ἐποίουν οἱ ὑμέτεροι πρόγονοι, ταῦθ’ ὑμῶν οἱ πρεσβύτεροι, οἲ Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς, καὶ πάλιν “ὑμεῖς τοίνυν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, Λακεδαιμονίων γῆς καὶ θαλάττης ἀρχόντων καὶ τὰ κύκλῳ τῆς Ἀττικῆς κατεχόντων ἁρμοσταῖς καὶ φρουραῖς, Εὔβοιαν, Τάναγραν, τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἅπασαν” καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς μέχρι τοῦ “ἐξήλθετε εἰς Ἁλίαρτον”. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τοῦ τοιούτου παραδείγματα ἐν τῶ Περὶ τοῦ στεφάνου διὰ τὸ φύσει ἀξιωματικὸν τοῦ λόγου καὶ λαμπρόν. Ἀλλʼ ἔννοιαι μὲν αὗται καὶ αἰ τοιαῦται λαμπραί.
(Hermogenes, Peri Ideōn 1.9)

Having treated Solemnity, Asperity, and Vehemence, we must now discuss Brilliance. Of those types that produce Grandeur and dignity Brilliance is especially important. This type is necessary in a dignified speech for several reasons, but especially because a speech that is solemn and harsh and vehement also needs an element of luster, so that it will not be overly severe. I do not mean by this the kind of luster that is produced by adornment. That is characteristic of Sweetness and Simplicity. Nor am I talking about the kind that produces a beautiful effect through the care taken with the arrangement of words in the sentences. The latter kind of style is decorative and is often found in Demosthenes. It is nevertheless slight and does not produce elevation and Grandeur. To make the passage really elevated, therefore, you do not need the kinds of luster just discussed, but the kind that is truly dignified. That is Brilliance, which I will discuss now. We have already mentioned the kind of style that is the opposite of Brilliance in the discussion of Vehemence, where we said that it is conversational and argumentative, composed of short phrases, and generally quick-paced. Therefore, a passage is brilliant with reference to the thought when the speaker has some confidence in what he is saying, either because what he is saying is generally approved or because he has acted honorably or because his audience is pleased with what he is saying or for all these reasons. In general Brilliance is inherent in those acts that are remarkable and in which one can gain luster, or, as Herodotus says (1.80), in which one can “shine.” This is the case in the following passages from Demosthenes’ speech On the Crown: “I did not fortify the city with stones and with bricks, nor do I consider that the greatest of my achievements reside in such things. But if you want to see the fortifications that I build you will find weapons and cities” etc. (299) or “This was the beginning of our dealings with Thebes and the first negotiation, since before this these men had reduced our attitude toward the Thebans to hostility and hatred and distrust. This decree caused the danger surrounding the city to disappear like a cloud” (188) or “Your ancestors did this, the elders among you did it when they saved the Spartans,” etc. (98) or “You, therefore, Athenians, when the Spartans ruled by land and sea and were holding with governors and garrisons all the frontiers of Attica, as well as Euboea, Tanagra, and all Boeotia,” etc. up to “you set out to Haliartus” (96). And there are many examples of such a style in the speech On the Crown because it is by nature dignified and brilliant. These thoughts, then, and those like them are characteristic of Brilliance. (tr. Cecil W. Wooten III)

Skorpios

Nicolas Poussin, Le Temps soustrait la Vérité aux attaques de l'Envie et de la Discorde, 1641
Nicolas Poussin, Le Temps soustrait la Vérité aux attaques de l’Envie et de la Discorde (1641)

Σκοπεῖτε γάρ. εἰσὶν ὁμοῦ δισμύριοι πάντες Ἀθηναῖοι. τούτων ἕκαστος ἕν γέ τι πράττων κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν περιέρχεται, ἤτοι νὴ τὸν Ἡρακλέα τῶν κοινῶν ἢ τῶν ἰδίων. ἀλλ’ οὐχ οὗτος οὐδέν, οὐδ’ ἂν ἔχοι δεῖξαι πρὸς ὅτῳ τὸν βίον ἐστὶ τῶν μετρίων ἢ καλῶν. οὐχὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπ’ οὐδενὶ τῇ ψυχῇ διατρίβει· οὐ τέχνης, οὐ γεωργίας, οὐκ ἄλλης ἐργασίας οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιμελεῖται· οὐ φιλανθρωπίας, οὐχ ὁμιλίας οὐδεμιᾶς οὐδενὶ κοινωνεῖ· ἀλλὰ πορεύεται διὰ τῆς ἀγορᾶς, ὥσπερ ἔχις ἢ σκορπίος ἠρκὼς τὸ κέντρον, ᾄττων δεῦρο κἀκεῖσε, σκοπῶν τίνι συμφορὰν ἢ βλασφημίαν ἢ κακόν τι προστριψάμενος καὶ καταστήσας εἰς φόβον ἀργύριον εἰσπράξεται. οὐδὲ προσφοιτᾷ πρός τι τούτων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει κουρείων ἢ μυροπωλίων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἐργαστηρίων οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕν· ἀλλ’ ἄσπειστος, ἀνίδρυτος, ἄμεικτος, οὐ χάριν, οὐ φιλίαν, οὐκ ἄλλ’ οὐδὲν ὧν ἄνθρωπος μέτριος γιγνώσκων· μεθ’ ὧν δ’ οἱ ζωγράφοι τοὺς ἀσεβεῖς ἐν Ἅϊδου γράφουσιν, μετὰ τούτων, μετ’ ἀρᾶς καὶ βλασφημίας καὶ φθόνου καὶ στάσεως καὶ νείκους, περιέρχεται.
(Demosthenes, Or. 25.51-52)

Think about it. There are about twenty thousand Athenians in all. Each of them does some private or public business, by Heracles, as he walks around the Agora. But this man does not do any such business, nor could he point to any moderate or respectable activity he has spent his life pursuing. He does not spend his time thinking about what is good for the state. He practices no skill, neither farming or any other occupation; he shares no kindness, no company with anyone. But he moves through the Agora like a viper or a scorpion with his sting erect, leaping here and there, looking for someone on whom to inflict disaster or slander or some disaster or to extort money by terrifying him. He does not frequent any of the barbershops or perfume shops or any other workshops in the city, not even one. Pitiless, without a fixed residence, antisocial, he knows nothing of gratitude, friendship, or any of the other qualities a decent man knows. Joined by those whom the painters depict in the company of the impious in Hades, he walks around with Curse, Slander, Envy, Discord, and Quarrel. (tr. Edward M. Harris)

Apērtēmenoi

Demosthenes (klein)

Πότ’ οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πόθ’ ἃ χρὴ πράξετε; ἐπειδὰν τί γένηται; ἐπειδὰν νὴ Δί’ ἀνάγκη τις ᾖ; νῦν δὲ τί χρὴ τὰ γιγνόμεν’ ἡγεῖσθαι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οἴομαι τοῖς ἐλευθέροις μεγίστην ἀνάγκην τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων αἰσχύνην εἶναι. ἢ βούλεσθ’, εἰπέ μοι, περιιόντες αὑτῶν πυνθάνεσθαι, “λέγεταί τι καινόν;” γένοιτο γὰρ ἄν τι καινότερον ἢ Μακεδὼν ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναίους καταπολεμῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων διοικῶν; “τέθνηκε Φίλιππος;”—”οὐ μὰ Δί’, ἀλλ’ ἀσθενεῖ.” τί δ’ ὑμῖν διαφέρει; καὶ γὰρ ἂν οὗτός τι πάθῃ, ταχέως ὑμεῖς ἕτερον Φίλιππον ποιήσετε, ἄνπερ οὕτω προσέχητε τοῖς πράγμασι τὸν νοῦν· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὗτος παρὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ῥώμην τοσοῦτον ἐπηύξηται ὅσον παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀμέλειαν. καίτοι καὶ τοῦτο· εἴ τι πάθοι καὶ τὰ τῆς τύχης ἡμῖν, ἥπερ ἀεὶ βέλτιον ἢ ἡμεῖς ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμεθα, καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐξεργάσαιτο, ἴσθ’ ὅτι πλησίον μὲν ὄντες, ἅπασιν ἂν τοῖς πράγμασιν τεταραγμένοις ἐπιστάντες ὅπως βούλεσθε διοικήσαισθε, ὡς δὲ νῦν ἔχετε, οὐδὲ διδόντων τῶν καιρῶν Ἀμφίπολιν δέξασθαι δύναισθ’ ἄν, ἀπηρτημένοι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς καὶ ταῖς γνώμαις.
(Demosthenes, Or. 4.10-12)

When, men of Athens, when will you do what is needed? What are you waiting for? For some necessity to arise, by Zeus? What, then, should we call the present developments? For, I believe, the strongest necessity for free men is shame at their situation. Or, tell me, do you wish to go around asking each other, “Is there any news?” What could be graver news than that a Macedonian is waging war on Athens and is in control of the affairs of Greece? “Is Philip dead?” “No, by Zeus, but he is sick.” What difference does it make to you? Even if something were to happen to him, you would soon create another Philip, if this is how you apply yourselves to the situation, since even he has not prospered by reason of his own strength as much as because of our neglect. Moreover, if Fortune, which always takes better care of us than we do of ourselves, should arrange for something to happen to him, you know that if you were on the scene, you might step in and in the general state of confusion arrange matters as you wish. But as you are now, even if the opportunity were to present itself, you would be unable to take Amphipolis, since you are disunited in your preparations and in your resolve. (tr. Jeremy Trevett)