Tag: Porphyry

Διττοῦ δὴ λόγου κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ὄντος, τοῦ μὲν ἐνδιαθέτου, τοῦ δὲ προφορικοῦ, καὶ πάλιν τοῦ μὲν κατωρθωμένου, τοῦ δὲ ἡμαρτημένου, ποτέρου ἀποστεροῦσι τὰ ζῷα διαρθρῶσαι προσῆκον. ἆρά γε τοῦ ὀρθοῦ μόνου, οὐχ ἁπλῶς δὲ τοῦ λόγου; ἢ παντελῶς παντὸς τοῦ τε ἔσω καὶ τοῦ ἔξω προϊόντος; ἐοίκασι δὴ τὴν παντελῆ στέρησιν αὐτῶν κατηγορεῖν, οὐ τὴν τοῦ κατωρθωμένου μόνον. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οὐκ ἄλογα, λογικὰ δὲ ἦν ἔτι τὰ ζῷα, καθάπερ σχεδὸν πάντες κατ’ αὐτοὺς οἱ ἄνθρωποι. σοφὸς μὲν γὰρ ἢ εἷς ἢ καὶ δύο κατ’ αὐτοὺς γεγόνασιν, ἐν οἷς μόνοις ὁ λόγος κατώρθωται, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι φαῦλοι πάντες· κἂν οἳ μὲν ὦσι προκόπτοντες, οἳ δὲ χύσιν τῆς φαυλότητος ἔχοντες, εἰ καὶ πάντες ὁμοίως λογικοί· ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς φιλαυτίας παρηγμένοι ἄλογα φασὶν τὰ ζῷα ἐφεξῆς τὰ ἄλλα σύμπαντα, τὴν παντελῆ στέρησιν τοῦ λόγου διὰ τῆς ἀλογίας μηνύειν ἐθέλοντες· καίτοι εἰ χρὴ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν, οὐ μόνον ἁπλῶς ὁ λόγος ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις θεωρεῖται, ἐν πολλοῖς δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ὑποβολὰς ἔχων πρὸς τὸ τέλειον. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν διττὸς ἦν, ὃ μὲν ἐν τῇ προφορᾷ, ὃ δὲ ἐν τῇ διαθέσει, ἀρξώμεθα πρότερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προφορικοῦ καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν τεταγμένου. εἰ δὴ προφορικός ἐστι λόγος φωνὴ διὰ γλώττης σημαντικὴ τῶν ἔνδον καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν παθῶν· κοινοτάτη γὰρ ἡ ἀπόδοσις αὕτη καὶ αἱρέσεως οὐδέπω ἐχομένη, ἀλλὰ μόνον τῆς τοῦ λόγου ἐννοίας· τί τούτου ἄπεστι τῶν ζῴων ὅσα φθέγγεται; τί δὲ οὐχὶ καὶ ἃ πάσχει τι, πρότερον καὶ πρὶν εἰπεῖν ὃ μέλλει, διενοήθη; λέγω δὴ διάνοιαν τὸ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κατὰ σιγὴν φωνούμενον. τοῦ τοίνυν ὑπὸ τῆς γλώττης φωνηθέντος, ὅπως ἂν καὶ φωνηθῇ, εἴτε βαρβάρως εἴτε Ἑλληνικῶς εἴτε κυνικῶς ἢ βοϊκῶς, λόγου γε ὄντος μέτοχα τὰ ζῷα τὰ φωνητικά, τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ νόμους τοὺς ἀνθρωπείους φθεγγομένων, τῶν δὲ ζῴων κατὰ νόμους οὓς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῆς φύσεως εἴληχεν ἕκαστον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἡμεῖς ξυνίεμεν, τί τοῦτο; οὐδὲ γὰρ τῆς Ἰνδῶν οἱ Ἕλληνες οὐδὲ τῆς Σκυθῶν ἢ Θρᾳκῶν ἢ Σύρων οἱ ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ τραφέντες· ἀλλ’ ἴσα κλαγγῇ γεράνων ὁ τῶν ἑτέρων τοῖς ἑτέροις ἦχος προσπίπτει. καίτοι ἐγγράμματος τοῖς ἑτέροις ἡ αὐτῶν καὶ ἔναρθρος, ὡς καὶ ἡμῖν ἡ ἡμετέρα· ἄναρθρος δὲ καὶ ἀγράμματος ἡ τῶν Σύρων φέρε εἰπεῖν ἢ τῶν Περσῶν, ὡς καὶ πᾶσιν ἡ τῶν ζῴων. καθάπερ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ψόφου μόνου ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα καὶ ἤχου, ἀξύνετοι ὄντες τῆς Σκυθῶν ὁμιλίας, καὶ κλαγγάζειν δοκοῦσιν καὶ μηδὲν διαρθροῦν, ἀλλ’ ἑνὶ ψόφῳ χρῆσθαι μακροτέρῳ ἢ βραχυτέρῳ, τὸ παρηλλαγμένον δὲ αὐτοῦ εἰς σημασίαν οὐδαμῶς προσπίπτει, ἐκείνοις δὲ εὐσύνετος ἡ φθέγξις καὶ πολὺ τὸ διάφορον ἔχουσα, καθάπερ ἡμῖν ἡ συνήθης· οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων ἡ ξύνεσις μὲν ἐκείνοις κατὰ γένος ἰδίως προσπίπτει, ἡμῖν δὲ ὁ ψόφος μόνος ἐξάκουστος, τῆς σημασίας ἐκλειπούσης, διὰ τὸ μηδένα διδαχθέντα τὴν ἡμετέραν διδάξαι ἡμᾶς διὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας τὴν ἑρμηνείαν τῶν λεγομένων παρὰ τοῖς ζῴοις. καίτοι εἰ δεῖ πιστεύειν τοῖς παλαιοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἐφ’ ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν πατέρων γεγονόσιν, εἰσὶν οἳ λέγονται ἐπακοῦσαι καὶ σύνεσιν ἔχειν τῆς τῶν ζῴων φθέγξεως· ὡς ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν παλαιῶν ὁ Μελάμπους καὶ ὁ Τειρεσίας καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, οὐ πρὸ πολλοῦ δὲ Ἀπολλώνιος ὁ Τυανεύς, ἐφ’ οὗ καὶ λέγεται, ὅτι τοῖς ἑταίροις συνόντος, χελιδόνος ἐπιπτάσης καὶ φθεγγομένης, εἶπεν ὅτι μηνύει ἡ χελιδὼν ταῖς ἄλλαις ὄνον πρὸ τοῦ ἄστεως πεπτωκέναι σίτου βαστάζοντα φορτίον, ὃ δὴ κεχύσθαι εἰς τὴν γῆν τοῦ ἀχθοφοροῦντος πεπτωκότος. ἑταῖρος δὲ ἡμῶν ἐξηγεῖτό τις, οἰκέτου εὐτυχῆσαι παιδός, ὃς πάντα ξυνίει τὰ φθέγματα τῶν ὀρνίθων, καὶ ἦν πάντα μαντικὰ καὶ τοῦ μετ’ ὀλίγον μέλλοντος ἀγγελτικά· ἀφαιρεθῆναι δὲ τὴν σύνεσιν, τῆς μητρὸς εὐλαβηθείσης μὴ δῶρον αὐτὸν βασιλεῖ πέμψειεν, καὶ καθεύδοντος εἰς τὰ ὦτα ἐνουρησάσης.
(Porphyrius, Peri Apochēs Empsuchōn 3.2-3)

According to the Stoics there are two kinds of logos, the internal and the expressive, and moreover there is correct and faulty logos. So it is proper to state exactly which of these animals lack. Is it only correct logos, and not logos altogether? Or is it logos in all respects, both the internal and that which proceeds to the outside? They appear to predicate complete deprivation of logos, not just of correct logos, for in the latter case even animals would be not irrational but rational, in the same way as (according to the Stoics) almost all human beings are. For, according to them, there have been one or even two wise men, in whom alone logos is correct, and the rest are all bad, even if some are making progress and others are overflowing with badness, and even though all alike are rational. It is self-love which leads them to say that all the other animals without exception are non-rational, meaning by ‘non-rationality’ complete deprivation of logos. But if we must speak the truth, not only can logos be seen in absolutely all animals, but in many of them it has the groundwork for being perfected. Now since there are two kinds of logos, one in expression and one in disposition, let us begin with expressive logos, logos organised by voice. If expressive logos is voice signifying with the tongue that which is experienced internally and in the soul (this is the most general definition, which does not depend on any school but only on the concept of logos) what in this is absent from those animals that speak? And why should a creature not first have thought what it experiences, even before it says what it is going to say? I mean by ‘thought’ that which is silently voiced in the soul. Now since that which is voiced by the tongue is logos however it is voiced, whether in barbarian or Greek, dog or cattle fashion, animals which have a voice share in logos, humans speaking in accordance with human customs and animals in accordance with the customs each has acquired from the gods and nature. And if we do not understand them, so what? Greeks do not understand Indian, nor do those brought up on Attic understand Scythian or Thracian or Syrian: the sound that each makes strikes the others like the calling of cranes. Yet for each their [language] can be written in letters and articulated, as ours can for us; but for us the [language] of Syrians, for instance, or Persians cannot be articulated or written, just as that of animals cannot be for any people.  For we are aware only of noise and sound, because we do not understand (for instance) Scythian conversation, and they seem to us to be calling and articulating nothing, but making one noise which is longer or shorter, whereas the modification of the noise to convey meaning does not strike us at all; yet to them their speech is easy to understand and very diverse, just as our accustomed speech is to us. Similarly in the case of animals, understanding comes to them in a way which is peculiar to each species, but we can hear only noise deficient in meaning, because no one who has been taught our language has taught us to translate into it what is said by animals. Yet, if we are to believe the ancients and those who lived in our own time and our fathers’ time, there are those who are said to have heard and understood the speech of animals. In ancient times there were Melampous and Tiresias and the like, and not long ago Apollonius of Tyana, of whom it is said that when he was with his companions a swallow flew over and called. ‘The swallow,’ he said, ‘is telling other swallows that a donkey has fallen outside the town carrying a load of grain, which spilled on the ground when the load-bearer fell.’ A friend of mine used to relate how he was lucky enough to have a slave-boy who understood all the speech of birds, and everything they said was a prophecy announcing what would shortly happen; but he lost his understanding because his mother feared that he would be sent as a gift to the emperor, and urinated in his ears as he slept. (tr. Gillian Clark)

Καὶ ὅτι μὲν ἄχρι γε αἰσθήσεως τῆς τε ἄλλης ὀργανώσεως τῆς τε κατὰ τὰ αἰσθητήρια καὶ τῆς κατὰ σάρκα ὁμοίως ἡμῖν διάκειται*, πᾶς σχεδὸν συγκεχώρηκεν. καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον τῶν κατὰ φύσιν παθῶν τε καὶ κινημάτων τῶν διὰ τούτων ὁμοίως ἡμῖν κεκοινώνηκεν, ἀλλ’ ἤδη καὶ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ νοσωδῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς θεωρουμένων. οὐκ ἂν δέ τις εὖ φρονῶν διὰ τὸ ἐξηλλαγμένον τῆς ἕξεως τοῦ σώματος ἄδεκτα λογικῆς εἴποι διαθέσεως, ὁρῶν καὶ ἐπ’ ἀνθρώπων πολλὴν τὴν παραλλαγὴν τῆς ἕξεως κατά τε γένη καὶ ἔθνη, καὶ ὅμως λογικοὺς συγχωρῶν πάντας. ὄνος μέν γε κατάρρῳ ἁλίσκεται, κἂν εἰς πνεύμονα αὐτῷ ῥυῇ τὸ νόσημα, ἀποθνῄσκει ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος· ἵππος δὲ καὶ ἔμπυος γίνεται καὶ φθίνει, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τέτανος λαμβάνει ἵππον καὶ ποδάγρα καὶ πυρετὸς καὶ λύσσα, ὁπότε καὶ κατωπιᾶν λέγεται. καὶ ἡ κύουσα ἵππος, ἐπειδὰν ὀσφρήσηται λύχνου ἀπεσβεσμένου, ἀμβλίσκει ὡς ἄνθρωπος. πυρέττει δὲ καὶ βοῦς καὶ μαίνεται, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ κάμηλος. κορώνη δὲ ψωριᾷ καὶ λεπριᾷ, ὥσπερ καὶ κύων· οὗτος μέν γε καὶ ποδαγριᾷ καὶ λυσσᾷ. ὗς δὲ βραγχᾷ, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον κύων, καὶ τὸ πάθος ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ κυνὸς κυνάγχη κέκληται. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν γνώριμα, ἐπεὶ σύννομα ταῦτα ἡμῖν τὰ ζῷα, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἐσμὲν ἄπειροι διὰ τὸ ἀσύνηθες. καὶ εὐνουχιζόμενα δὲ μαλακίζεται· οἱ μέν γε ἀλεκτρυόνες οὐδὲ ᾄδουσιν ἔτι, ἀλλὰ τὴν φωνὴν ἐπὶ τὸ θῆλυ μεταβάλλουσιν ὥσπερ ἄνθρωποι, βοός τε κέρατα καὶ φωνὴν οὐκ ἔστι διαγνῶναι τομίου καὶ θήλεος· οἱ δὲ ἔλαφοι οὐκέτι ἀποβάλλουσι τὰ κέρατα, ἀλλὰ συνέχουσιν, ὡς εὐνοῦχοι τὰς τρίχας, μὴ ἔχοντες δὲ οὐ φύουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ πρὶν πώγωνα φῦσαι ἐκτμηθέντες. οὕτως σχεδὸν ἁπάντων τὰ σώματα ὁμοίως τοῖς ἡμετέροις κατὰ τὰ πάθη.

* sc. τὰ ζῶα

(Porphyrius, Peri Apochēs Empsuchōn 3.7.2-7)

Almost everyone agrees that animals are like us in perception and in organisation generally with regard both to sense-organs and to the flesh. They share like us not only in natural experiences and the movements they cause, but even in unnatural and unhealthy experiences which are observed in them. No sensible person would say that animals are incapable of a rational disposition because they are quite different in their bodily constitution, seeing that in human beings too there is great variation of constitution according to race and people, yet also agreeing that all are rational. Donkeys catch colds, and if the illness descends to the lung, the donkey dies as a human does; horses have abscesses and consumption like humans, get tetanus and gout and fever and rabies, and sometimes ‘cast down their eyes’. A pregnant mare miscarries, like a human being, if she smells a light which has been snuffed. Cattle get fever and go mad, and so do camels. Crows suffer from mange and leprosy, as do dogs; and dogs also suffer from gout and rabies. Pigs become hoarse, dogs even more so, and the illness in humans is called ‘dog-choker’ from dogs. These instances are well-known because these animals live with us, but we lack experience of other animals because we are not familiar with them. Animals also become soft when castrated: cocks cease to crow, and change their voice to the female kind as humans do; the horns and voice of a castrated bull cannot be distinguished from those of the female. Deer no longer shed their antlers, but retain them, as eunuchs do their hair; but if they have no horns they do not grow them, as with men who were castrated before their beard grew. Thus the bodies of almost all animals are like ours as regards illness. (tr. Gillian Clark)

Ὁ δὲ κελεύων μὴ ἐσθίειν καὶ ἄδικον ἡγούμενος, οὐδὲ κτείνειν δίκαιον ἐρεῖ οὐδὲ ψυχὰς ἀφαιρεῖσθαι. ἀλλὰ μὴν πρός γε τὰ θηρία πόλεμος ἡμῖν ἔμφυτος ἅμα καὶ δίκαιος. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἑκόντα ἐπιτίθεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὥσπερ λύκοι καὶ λέοντες· τὰ δ’ οὐχ ἑκόντα, ὥσπερ οἱ ἔχεις· πατηθέντες γὰρ ἐνίοτε δάκνουσιν· καὶ τὰ μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπιτίθεται, τὰ δὲ τοὺς καρποὺς φθείρει· ὑπὲρ ὧν πάντων μέτιμεν ταῦτα, καὶ τὰ κατάρξαντα θηρία κτείνομεν καὶ τὰ μὴ κατάρξαντα, ὡς μή τι πρὸς αὐτῶν πάθωμεν. οὐκ ἔστιν γὰρ ὅστις ἰδὼν ὄφιν οὐκ ἔκτεινε δυνάμενος, ὡς μήτ’ αὐτὸς δηχθείη μήτ’ ἄλλος ἁπλῶς ἄνθρωπος· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἐστὶ μῖσος κατὰ τῶν κτεινομένων, ἀλλὰ καὶ στοργὴ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπου. δικαίου δ’ ὄντος τοῦ πρὸς τὰ θηρία πολέμου πολλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα τῶν συνανθρωπούντων. ὅθεν οἱ Ἕλληνες οὔτε κυνοφαγοῦσιν οὔθ’ ἵππους ἐσθίουσιν οὔτ’ ὄνους μέντοι ἐσθίουσιν ὡς ταὐτοῦ γένους τοῖς ἀγρίοις τὸ ἥμερον· ὡσαύτως τε τοὺς ὄρνιθας. οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστι χρήσιμον πρὸς ἄλλο τι ὗς ἢ πρὸς βρῶσιν. Φοίνικες δὲ καὶ Ἰουδαῖοι ἀπέσχοντο, ὅτι οὐδ’ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς τόποις ἐφύετο· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ νῦν ἐν Αἰθιοπίᾳ φασὶν ὁρᾶσθαι τὸ ζῷον τοῦτο. ὡς οὖν κάμηλον ἢ ἐλέφαντα Ἑλλήνων οὐδεὶς θεοῖς ἔθυσε, παρ’ ὅσον οὐδ’ ἤνεγκεν ἡ Ἑλλὰς ταῦτα τὰ ζῷα, οὕτως οὐδ’ ἐν Κύπρῳ ἢ Φοινίκῃ θεοῖς προσήχθη τὸ ζῷον τοῦτο, παρ’ ὅσον οὐκ ἦν ἐντόπιον· οὐδὲ Αἰγύπτιοι θεοῖς θύουσιν ὗν παρὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. τὸ δ’ ὅλως ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ζῴου τινὰς ὅμοιόν ἐστιν τῷ μηδ’ ἂν ἡμᾶς ἐθελῆσαι καμήλεια ἐσθίειν. διὰ τί δ’ ἄν τις καὶ ἀπόσχοιτο τῶν ἐμψύχων; ἆρά γε τὴν ψυχὴν χείρω ποιεῖ ἢ τὸ σῶμα; δῆλον δ’ ἐστὶν ὡς οὐδέτερον. τὰ γὰρ σαρκοφαγοῦντα ζῷα συνετώτερα τῶν ἄλλων. θηρευτικὰ γοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ τέχνην ἔχει ταύτην, ἀφ’ ἧς περιποιεῖται τὸν βίον, ἰσχύν τε καὶ ἀλκὴν κέκτηται, ὥσπερ λέοντες καὶ λύκοι· ὥσθ’ ἡ κρεοφαγία οὔτε τὴν ψυχὴν οὔτε τὸ σῶμα λυμαίνεται. δῆλον δ’ ἐστὶ κἀκ τοῦ τοὺς ἀθλητὰς τὰ σώματα κρείσσω τῇ κρεοφαγίᾳ παρέχειν, κἀκ τῶν ἰατρῶν, οἳ τὰ ἐκ τῆς ἀρρωστίας σώματα ἀναλαμβάνουσι ταῖς κρεοφαγίαις. τοῦ δὲ μὴ ὑγιῶς δοξάσαι τὸν Πυθαγόραν σημεῖον οὐ μικρόν· τῶν γὰρ σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν οὐδεὶς ἐπείσθη, οὔτε τῶν ἑπτὰ οὔτε τῶν ὕστερον γενομένων φυσικῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ὁ σοφώτατος Σωκράτης οὐδ’ οἱ ἀπὸ Σωκράτους.
(Porphyry, Peri Apochēs Empsuchōn 1.14-15)

Someone who says we should not eat [animals], thinking it unjust, will also say that it is unjust to kill them and to take away their souls. But between us and the beasts there is a war which is innate and also just. Some beasts intentionally attack humans, as wolves and lions do; some attack unintentionally, like snakes, which sometimes bite because they have been trodden on. Some attack humans, some destroy crops. For all these reasons we go after them: we kill beasts, both those that take the initiative and those that do not, to avoid suffering any harm from them. Anyone who sees a snake kills it if he can, so that neither he nor any other human being should be bitten; for we have not only hatred for the creatures which are killed, but also affection of human for human. But though the war against the beasts is just, we abstain from many that live with humans. That is why the Greeks do not eat dogs, or horses, or donkeys. They do eat pigs, because domestic pigs are of the same race as wild pig, and likewise birds. Indeed, pigs are not useful for anything except for eating. Phoenicians and Jews abstain [from pigs], because there were none at all in those places; and even now, they say, this animal is not found in Ethiopia. So, just as no Greek has sacrificed a camel or elephant to the gods, because Greece does not produce these creatures, so in Cyprus and Phoenicia this animal was not offered to the gods, because it was not local, and the Egyptians do not sacrifice pigs to the gods for the same reason. So some people abstain entirely from this animal, but it is as if we refused to eat camels. Why would anyone abstain from animate creatures? Do they make the soul worse, or the body? Obviously, neither. Flesh-eating animals are more intelligent than the others: they are hunters, and have this skill with which they get a living and acquire strength and fighting spirit, like lions and wolves. So meat-eating does not damage either the soul or the body. This is also clear from the fact that athletes make their bodies stronger by meat-eating, and from doctors, who prescribe meat-eating to restore bodies which are recovering from illness. There is also strong evidence that Pythagoras’ views were unsound: none of the sages was convinced, either from the Seven or from the later natural scientists, not even Socrates, wisest of all, or his successors. (tr. Gillian Clark)