Nosōdōn

34cc2c733bc2a3e3ae378c98205f6b87--mini-horses-winter-solstice

Καὶ ὅτι μὲν ἄχρι γε αἰσθήσεως τῆς τε ἄλλης ὀργανώσεως τῆς τε κατὰ τὰ αἰσθητήρια καὶ τῆς κατὰ σάρκα ὁμοίως ἡμῖν διάκειται*, πᾶς σχεδὸν συγκεχώρηκεν. καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον τῶν κατὰ φύσιν παθῶν τε καὶ κινημάτων τῶν διὰ τούτων ὁμοίως ἡμῖν κεκοινώνηκεν, ἀλλ’ ἤδη καὶ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ νοσωδῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς θεωρουμένων. οὐκ ἂν δέ τις εὖ φρονῶν διὰ τὸ ἐξηλλαγμένον τῆς ἕξεως τοῦ σώματος ἄδεκτα λογικῆς εἴποι διαθέσεως, ὁρῶν καὶ ἐπ’ ἀνθρώπων πολλὴν τὴν παραλλαγὴν τῆς ἕξεως κατά τε γένη καὶ ἔθνη, καὶ ὅμως λογικοὺς συγχωρῶν πάντας. ὄνος μέν γε κατάρρῳ ἁλίσκεται, κἂν εἰς πνεύμονα αὐτῷ ῥυῇ τὸ νόσημα, ἀποθνῄσκει ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος· ἵππος δὲ καὶ ἔμπυος γίνεται καὶ φθίνει, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τέτανος λαμβάνει ἵππον καὶ ποδάγρα καὶ πυρετὸς καὶ λύσσα, ὁπότε καὶ κατωπιᾶν λέγεται. καὶ ἡ κύουσα ἵππος, ἐπειδὰν ὀσφρήσηται λύχνου ἀπεσβεσμένου, ἀμβλίσκει ὡς ἄνθρωπος. πυρέττει δὲ καὶ βοῦς καὶ μαίνεται, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ κάμηλος. κορώνη δὲ ψωριᾷ καὶ λεπριᾷ, ὥσπερ καὶ κύων· οὗτος μέν γε καὶ ποδαγριᾷ καὶ λυσσᾷ. ὗς δὲ βραγχᾷ, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον κύων, καὶ τὸ πάθος ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ κυνὸς κυνάγχη κέκληται. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν γνώριμα, ἐπεὶ σύννομα ταῦτα ἡμῖν τὰ ζῷα, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἐσμὲν ἄπειροι διὰ τὸ ἀσύνηθες. καὶ εὐνουχιζόμενα δὲ μαλακίζεται· οἱ μέν γε ἀλεκτρυόνες οὐδὲ ᾄδουσιν ἔτι, ἀλλὰ τὴν φωνὴν ἐπὶ τὸ θῆλυ μεταβάλλουσιν ὥσπερ ἄνθρωποι, βοός τε κέρατα καὶ φωνὴν οὐκ ἔστι διαγνῶναι τομίου καὶ θήλεος· οἱ δὲ ἔλαφοι οὐκέτι ἀποβάλλουσι τὰ κέρατα, ἀλλὰ συνέχουσιν, ὡς εὐνοῦχοι τὰς τρίχας, μὴ ἔχοντες δὲ οὐ φύουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ πρὶν πώγωνα φῦσαι ἐκτμηθέντες. οὕτως σχεδὸν ἁπάντων τὰ σώματα ὁμοίως τοῖς ἡμετέροις κατὰ τὰ πάθη.

* sc. τὰ ζῶα

(Porphyrius, Peri Apochēs Empsuchōn 3.7.2-7)

Almost everyone agrees that animals are like us in perception and in organisation generally with regard both to sense-organs and to the flesh. They share like us not only in natural experiences and the movements they cause, but even in unnatural and unhealthy experiences which are observed in them. No sensible person would say that animals are incapable of a rational disposition because they are quite different in their bodily constitution, seeing that in human beings too there is great variation of constitution according to race and people, yet also agreeing that all are rational. Donkeys catch colds, and if the illness descends to the lung, the donkey dies as a human does; horses have abscesses and consumption like humans, get tetanus and gout and fever and rabies, and sometimes ‘cast down their eyes’. A pregnant mare miscarries, like a human being, if she smells a light which has been snuffed. Cattle get fever and go mad, and so do camels. Crows suffer from mange and leprosy, as do dogs; and dogs also suffer from gout and rabies. Pigs become hoarse, dogs even more so, and the illness in humans is called ‘dog-choker’ from dogs. These instances are well-known because these animals live with us, but we lack experience of other animals because we are not familiar with them. Animals also become soft when castrated: cocks cease to crow, and change their voice to the female kind as humans do; the horns and voice of a castrated bull cannot be distinguished from those of the female. Deer no longer shed their antlers, but retain them, as eunuchs do their hair; but if they have no horns they do not grow them, as with men who were castrated before their beard grew. Thus the bodies of almost all animals are like ours as regards illness. (tr. Gillian Clark)

Ēnescheto

Mihály Munkácsy, Christus voor Pilatus, 1881
Mihály Munkácsy, Christ in front of Pilate, 1881

Τίνος ἕνεκεν ὁ Χριστὸς οὔτε τῷ ἀρχιερεῖ προσαχθεὶς οὔτε τῷ ἡγεμόνι ἄξιόν τι σοφοῦ καὶ θείου ἀνδρὸς ἐφθέγξατο δυνάμενον καὶ τὸν κριτὴν καὶ τοὺς παρεστῶτας παιδεύσαι καὶ βελτίους ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλ’ ἠνέσχετο καλάμῳ τύπτεσθαι καὶ περιπτύεσθαι καὶ στεφανοῦσθαι ἀκάνθαις, καὶ μὴ καθάπερ Ἀπολλώνιος μετὰ παρρησίας τῷ αὐτοκράτορι λαλήσας Δομετιανῷ τῆς βασιλικῆς αὐλῆς ἀφανὴς ἐγένετο, καὶ μεθ’ ὥρας οὐ πολλὰς ἐν πόλει Δικαιαρχίᾳ, νῦν δὲ Ποτιόλοις καλουμένῃ, ὤφθη ἐπιφανέστατος; ὁ δέ γε Χριστὸς εἰ καὶ παθεῖν εἶχε κατ’ ἐντολὰς τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἐχρῆν μὲν ὑπομεῖναι τὴν τιμωρίαν, οὐ μὴν ἄνευ παρρησίας ὑποστῆναι τὸ πάθος, ἀλλὰ σπουδαῖά τινα καὶ σοφὰ διαφθέγξασθαι πρὸς Πιλᾶτον τὸν δικαστήν, καὶ μὴ ὡς εἷς τῶν ἐκ τριόδου χυδαίων ὑβρισθῆναι.
(Porphyrius, Adv. Christ. fr. 63 = Macarius Magnes, Apocr. 3.1)

When brought before the high priest and Roman governor, why didn’t Jesus say anything to suggest he was wise or divine? He could have taught his judge and his accusers how to become better men! But, no: he only manages to be whipped and spit on and crowned with briars—unlike Apollonius who talked back to the emperor Domitian, vanished from the palace and soon was to be seen by many in the city of Dicearchia, now called Puteoli. And even if Christ’s suffering was carried out according to God’s plan, even if he was meant to suffer punishment—at least he might have faced his suffering nobly and spoken words of power and wisdom to Pilate, his judge, instead of being made fun of like a peasant boy in the big city. (tr. Raymond Joseph Hoffmann)

Kreophagia

roastedbeeftenderloin-Cumbraes-istock-LivFriis-Larsen_0

Ὁ δὲ κελεύων μὴ ἐσθίειν καὶ ἄδικον ἡγούμενος, οὐδὲ κτείνειν δίκαιον ἐρεῖ οὐδὲ ψυχὰς ἀφαιρεῖσθαι. ἀλλὰ μὴν πρός γε τὰ θηρία πόλεμος ἡμῖν ἔμφυτος ἅμα καὶ δίκαιος. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἑκόντα ἐπιτίθεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὥσπερ λύκοι καὶ λέοντες· τὰ δ’ οὐχ ἑκόντα, ὥσπερ οἱ ἔχεις· πατηθέντες γὰρ ἐνίοτε δάκνουσιν· καὶ τὰ μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπιτίθεται, τὰ δὲ τοὺς καρποὺς φθείρει· ὑπὲρ ὧν πάντων μέτιμεν ταῦτα, καὶ τὰ κατάρξαντα θηρία κτείνομεν καὶ τὰ μὴ κατάρξαντα, ὡς μή τι πρὸς αὐτῶν πάθωμεν. οὐκ ἔστιν γὰρ ὅστις ἰδὼν ὄφιν οὐκ ἔκτεινε δυνάμενος, ὡς μήτ’ αὐτὸς δηχθείη μήτ’ ἄλλος ἁπλῶς ἄνθρωπος· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἐστὶ μῖσος κατὰ τῶν κτεινομένων, ἀλλὰ καὶ στοργὴ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπου. δικαίου δ’ ὄντος τοῦ πρὸς τὰ θηρία πολέμου πολλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα τῶν συνανθρωπούντων. ὅθεν οἱ Ἕλληνες οὔτε κυνοφαγοῦσιν οὔθ’ ἵππους ἐσθίουσιν οὔτ’ ὄνους μέντοι ἐσθίουσιν ὡς ταὐτοῦ γένους τοῖς ἀγρίοις τὸ ἥμερον· ὡσαύτως τε τοὺς ὄρνιθας. οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστι χρήσιμον πρὸς ἄλλο τι ὗς ἢ πρὸς βρῶσιν. Φοίνικες δὲ καὶ Ἰουδαῖοι ἀπέσχοντο, ὅτι οὐδ’ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς τόποις ἐφύετο· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ νῦν ἐν Αἰθιοπίᾳ φασὶν ὁρᾶσθαι τὸ ζῷον τοῦτο. ὡς οὖν κάμηλον ἢ ἐλέφαντα Ἑλλήνων οὐδεὶς θεοῖς ἔθυσε, παρ’ ὅσον οὐδ’ ἤνεγκεν ἡ Ἑλλὰς ταῦτα τὰ ζῷα, οὕτως οὐδ’ ἐν Κύπρῳ ἢ Φοινίκῃ θεοῖς προσήχθη τὸ ζῷον τοῦτο, παρ’ ὅσον οὐκ ἦν ἐντόπιον· οὐδὲ Αἰγύπτιοι θεοῖς θύουσιν ὗν παρὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. τὸ δ’ ὅλως ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ζῴου τινὰς ὅμοιόν ἐστιν τῷ μηδ’ ἂν ἡμᾶς ἐθελῆσαι καμήλεια ἐσθίειν. διὰ τί δ’ ἄν τις καὶ ἀπόσχοιτο τῶν ἐμψύχων; ἆρά γε τὴν ψυχὴν χείρω ποιεῖ ἢ τὸ σῶμα; δῆλον δ’ ἐστὶν ὡς οὐδέτερον. τὰ γὰρ σαρκοφαγοῦντα ζῷα συνετώτερα τῶν ἄλλων. θηρευτικὰ γοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ τέχνην ἔχει ταύτην, ἀφ’ ἧς περιποιεῖται τὸν βίον, ἰσχύν τε καὶ ἀλκὴν κέκτηται, ὥσπερ λέοντες καὶ λύκοι· ὥσθ’ ἡ κρεοφαγία οὔτε τὴν ψυχὴν οὔτε τὸ σῶμα λυμαίνεται. δῆλον δ’ ἐστὶ κἀκ τοῦ τοὺς ἀθλητὰς τὰ σώματα κρείσσω τῇ κρεοφαγίᾳ παρέχειν, κἀκ τῶν ἰατρῶν, οἳ τὰ ἐκ τῆς ἀρρωστίας σώματα ἀναλαμβάνουσι ταῖς κρεοφαγίαις. τοῦ δὲ μὴ ὑγιῶς δοξάσαι τὸν Πυθαγόραν σημεῖον οὐ μικρόν· τῶν γὰρ σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν οὐδεὶς ἐπείσθη, οὔτε τῶν ἑπτὰ οὔτε τῶν ὕστερον γενομένων φυσικῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ὁ σοφώτατος Σωκράτης οὐδ’ οἱ ἀπὸ Σωκράτους.
(Porphyry, Peri Apochēs Empsuchōn 1.14-15)

Someone who says we should not eat [animals], thinking it unjust, will also say that it is unjust to kill them and to take away their souls. But between us and the beasts there is a war which is innate and also just. Some beasts intentionally attack humans, as wolves and lions do; some attack unintentionally, like snakes, which sometimes bite because they have been trodden on. Some attack humans, some destroy crops. For all these reasons we go after them: we kill beasts, both those that take the initiative and those that do not, to avoid suffering any harm from them. Anyone who sees a snake kills it if he can, so that neither he nor any other human being should be bitten; for we have not only hatred for the creatures which are killed, but also affection of human for human. But though the war against the beasts is just, we abstain from many that live with humans. That is why the Greeks do not eat dogs, or horses, or donkeys. They do eat pigs, because domestic pigs are of the same race as wild pig, and likewise birds. Indeed, pigs are not useful for anything except for eating. Phoenicians and Jews abstain [from pigs], because there were none at all in those places; and even now, they say, this animal is not found in Ethiopia. So, just as no Greek has sacrificed a camel or elephant to the gods, because Greece does not produce these creatures, so in Cyprus and Phoenicia this animal was not offered to the gods, because it was not local, and the Egyptians do not sacrifice pigs to the gods for the same reason. So some people abstain entirely from this animal, but it is as if we refused to eat camels. Why would anyone abstain from animate creatures? Do they make the soul worse, or the body? Obviously, neither. Flesh-eating animals are more intelligent than the others: they are hunters, and have this skill with which they get a living and acquire strength and fighting spirit, like lions and wolves. So meat-eating does not damage either the soul or the body. This is also clear from the fact that athletes make their bodies stronger by meat-eating, and from doctors, who prescribe meat-eating to restore bodies which are recovering from illness. There is also strong evidence that Pythagoras’ views were unsound: none of the sages was convinced, either from the Seven or from the later natural scientists, not even Socrates, wisest of all, or his successors. (tr. Gillian Clark)